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J a c k i e S t a c e y
Masculinity, Masquerade, and Genetic Impersonation:
Gattaca’s Queer Visions
I n the opening sequence of Gattaca (1997), an enigmatic scene of min-imalist formal beauty gradually becomes a display of the shedding ofabject bodily detritus for the purpose of an elaborate disguise. In the
first few shots of the film, the excessive visual magnification of nail clip-
pings, strands of hair, and flakes of skin effects a visual deception upon
the audience: the nails look like large crescent-shaped pieces of frosted
glass, the hair like lengths of rubber piping, the shower of skin like a
beautiful snowfall. Initially unidentifiable, these gigantic bodily fragments
fall in slow motion, hitting the ground with a thudding vibration as they
eventually settle on a luminous blue surface that fills the screen. The
exquisite visual poise of the mise-en-sce`ne is underscored by Michael Ny-
man’s melancholic, minimalist music, which completes the seductive aes-
thetic of tranquility and perfection governing the scene. As the magni-
fication lessens, the human source of these falling objects is slowly revealed:
a chin is being shaved; a rather androgynous chest is being scrubbed;
muscular arms are being abraded. A male figure is shown vigorously and
painfully discarding all these external bodily traces in a cubicle bathed in
deep blue light; he leaves the shower room and, with a gesture suggesting
the ease of daily habit, turns on the incinerator inside it to obliterate all
evidence of his physical presence. This ritual cleansing then starts to look
like something else: the work of disguise. The man takes two medical
infusion bags from a refrigerator; he attaches one to his now hairless upper
leg at the level usually reserved for a garter belt and injects a sample of
the blood from the other into a pocket in a false fingertip, which he
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adheres to the index finger of his right hand, using an eyebrow brush to
secure the edges. His routine complete, he drives to work at Gattaca, a
space exploration center.
Gattaca is a film about a genetically defective man, Vincent (Ethan
Hawke), who disguises himself as a genetically perfect one, Jerome (Jude
Law). Its opening scene rehearses a disorienting visual deceit that con-
denses the film’s more general exploration of the artifice of masculine
perfection in the age of genetic engineering. These hypermagnified shots
of bodily fragments foreshadow the film’s more general investigation of
the relationship between scientific and cinematic technologies. The sci-
entific and cinematic gazes merge as microscopic magnification and ex-
treme close-up shots combine in this credit sequence to bring us close
enough to these corporeal fragments to feel as if we could almost touch
them.1 Seeing the body so close up and yet misrecognizing it so profoundly
invites contemplation of the relationship between seeing and knowing,
between observable corporeal surfaces and the identities beneath them.
Should we trust the knowledge promised by visual technologies? To what
extent can they deliver the truth of a person’s identity? For if these close-
up shots offer the promise of truth through the magnified and slowed-
down image, they do so, ultimately, only to undermine its certainty: more
vision, in this film, often leads to less knowledge, to distortion, to mis-
reading, and even to a reversal of perception.2 What appears under the
microscopic cinematic gaze as a beautiful snow scene is transformed into
a shower of discarded dead skin by a slight shift in visual perspective. The
slowing down of time combines with the magnification of objects to
transform bodily abjection into aesthetically pleasing abstraction. And as
the whole trajectory of the film demonstrates, visual evidence and genetic
evidence are not seamless equivalents, nor are they reliably transparent;
both are open to manipulation and susceptible to the indeterminacies of
interpretation. Even where genetic engineering promises to make biology
definitively predictive, image and identity cannot simply be read from
technology; they must be achieved through it. In Gattaca, identity is not
a straightforward question of image or even of embodiment; rather, it is
informatic. Identity here is a question of convincing your audience that
1 The touchability of the image here is reminiscent of what Laura Marks (2000) has
called a “haptic” quality.
2 The relationships among technology, surveillance, and knowledge are a familiar theme
in science fiction, e.g., in Minority Report (2002). For cultural analyses of science fiction
film more generally, see Kuhn 1990, 1999; Penley et al. 1991; Sobchack 1997; Telotte 1999;
Wood 2002.
S I G N S Spring 2005 ❙ 1853
the genetic screening technologies designed to return the sign of the body
to transparency make human interpretation unnecessary.
Set in the not-too-distant future, Gattaca is a dystopian science fiction
thriller offering a fantasy of a rigidly hierarchical society in which genetic
screening and selection brutally govern the fate of individuals. People’s
DNA can be tested from envelopes they have licked, hands they have
shaken, mouths they have kissed, eyelashes they have shed. For a fee,
anyone can use a strand of hair to have a potential sexual partner sequenced
in a matter of minutes, to match for genetic compatibility. This is a world
in which the blood test has replaced the police interrogation and the urine
test has replaced the job interview. The inequalities that result from these
genetic selections are presented most sharply in the space agency, Gattaca.
Here, valids (those selected from genetically superior embryos) occupy
the high-status positions and are valued for their exceptional intellectual
and physical attributes, while those not preselected, the in-valids, a term
with obvious connotations of physical inferiority, constitute the team of
cleaners that services the building and its employees. Gattaca presents the
nightmare of a new form of segregated workforce whose classification
seems to have made perversely irrelevant the traditional antidemocratic
hierarchies of race, class, and gender: in this world of genetic normativity,
even white middle-class men like Vincent can be destined for repetitive,
menial labor.3 Motivated by sibling rivalry, however, he proves his brother,
his father, and the scientists wrong (but his mother right), defying the
limits of his genetically predicted future by becoming a space navigator
at Gattaca. The means to this rebellious end is the adoption of the genetic
identity of a valid—Jerome Eugene Morrow—an Olympic-standard swim-
mer whose genetic code is practically perfect but whose accident abroad
has left him wheelchair bound.
The quest for genetic perfection that governs Gattaca’s dystopian fan-
tasy is articulated through the film’s fascination with visual perfection (see
fig. 1). As David Kirby has written, “Visually GATTACA conveys an an-
tiseptic world that has been purged of imperfections. . . . [The sets] show
a sterile and blemish-free world filled with smooth stainless steel surfaces”
(Kirby 2000, 204). The preoccupation with visual perfection within a
world of genetic normativity is centrally elaborated through Vincent’s
disguise as Jerome. Vincent imitates visual perfection by impersonating
Jerome (whose embodiment of desirability is amplified by the casting of
3 As Kaja Silverman (1991) has argued in relation to Blade Runner (1982), slavery
separated from race provides a fertile fantasy for the threat of replication in science fiction
film.
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Figure 1 The mise-en-sce`ne is governed by a genetic aesthetic of a particular visual per-
fection (symmetry, order, repetition, balance), as exemplified here in Gattaca’s gymnasium.
Courtesy of the British Film Institute. Color version available as an online enhancement.
Jude Law) and by displaying the exacting precision of disguise necessary
to avoid genetic detection. The opening scene shows Vincent’s daily phys-
ical transformation into Jerome as a spectacle of identity production. And
yet, in so doing, it displays for the cinema audience precisely the deceit
that genetic screening promises to eradicate. In order to imitate Jerome’s
genetic perfection, Vincent changes both his outward appearance to ap-
proximate Jerome’s image and his “informatic code” by substituting the
bodily markers of Jerome’s genetic information (blood, urine, skin, hair)
for his own. In this spectacle, the technologies of imitation are set against
the technologies of genetic testing. With Jerome’s assistance, Vincent
becomes master of the image and master of deception. Artifice is their
greatest ally against genetic determinism.
If the veracity of visual evidence is destabilized in Gattaca, so too is
the veracity of the body as the guarantor of the apparent truths of gender,
genealogy, and kinship. In placing Vincent and Jerome’s criminal decep-
tion at the heart of the discrepancy between visual evidence and genetic
evidence (between the image and information), the film arguably undoes
the singularity of masculine sovereignty and queers traditional forms of
kinship as much as it does conventional forms of vision.4 Biogenetic in-
4 For a discussion of alternative kinship modes within lesbian, gay, and queer communities,
see Weston 1991.
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heritance is displaced through the rejection of genetic normativity as the
audience gradually becomes privy to the alternative bonds of relatedness
and forms of intimacy between the two men. For the production of Vin-
cent and Jerome’s shared bodily substances requires the improvisation of
an intermasculine kinship with a distinctly queer feel.5 In their reinvention
of the blood tie as genetic impersonation, Vincent and Jerome unite
against normative injustice in their new form of shared embodiment.6 Like
the male “couples” in Rope (1948) and Swoon (1992), Vincent and Jerome
are locked into a sometimes claustrophobic mutual dependence; their
combined ingenuity is required to execute their crime successfully. But
unlike the couples in Rope and Swoon, Vincent and Jerome are tied to
each other through a commitment to a new, shared fabricated persona
(one gives his body, the other his dream), and thus their loyalty to each
other is always also a loyalty to themselves. Their embodied deception
defies both the conventions of masculine singularity and the deterministic
laws of the new genetics through a reconceptualization of identity beyond
traditional definitions of genealogy, gender, and heterosexuality.7
In this sense, although Gattaca is not strictly a cloning film, such as
Multiplicity (1996), Alien Resurrection (1997), and Star Wars II: Attack
of the Clones (2002), it nevertheless shares a preoccupation with tech-
nologies of duplication and a fascination with deviant forms of related-
ness.8 While rejecting the injustice of genetic determinism, the film nev-
ertheless stages a cinematic vision of cloning through the imitative
replication of masculine perfection. Vincent becomes Jerome’s clone in-
sofar as he successfully passes as genetically perfect at Gattaca. The play
with narrative tensions around passing (will Vincent be caught?) rehearses
the familiar generic concern of science fiction with the problem of the
authenticity of identity and the suspense around detection; it also, of
course, rehearses a set of associations with the homosexual closet.9 In the
face of their possible discovery, Vincent and Jerome’s mutual loyalty and
devotion to their secret commitment are repeatedly tested and ultimately
strengthened. The intimate exchanges between the two men (of fluids,
5 I am grateful to Lauren Berlant for suggesting the term improvisation here.
6 For a recent analysis of the blood tie and kinship theory, see Franklin and McKinnon
2001.
7 I am indebted to the “Postmodern Genealogies” reading group at Lancaster University
for discussions about queer kinship and shared bodily substances.
8 For an analysis of the queer cloning of Ripley in Alien Resurrection (1997), see Stacey
2003.
9 The suspense about who is authentic and who is artificial is endlessly rehearsed in
science fiction film, most famously perhaps in Blade Runner (1982).
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of knowledge, of dreams, of identities) expose the limits of their individual
autonomy and push to the surface the mutuality of their improvised em-
bodiment. In cloning Jerome, the two men enter the terrain not only of
queer kinship but also of homoeroticism. Passing and cloning (with their
obvious homosexual connotations) are only two dimensions of the queer
implications of the criminal intimacy of genetic deception in this film.
In this article, I focus on the ways in which these multiple queer im-
provisations are set in tension with the more traditional cinematic orga-
nization of sexual difference. The combination of the display of the artifice
of a masculine impersonation with the queering of kinship in a post-
genealogical age makes this film interesting for feminist analysis. For while
Vincent’s disguise requires a consideration of the operations of sexual
difference in this spectacle of masculine artifice, the intimacy of his col-
laboration with Jerome as master of genetic disguise calls for queer theory
to unravel the homoeroticism of impersonation and new loyalties of queer
kinship. Taking Gattaca as my central text, I shall examine the problem
of rendering masculinity an authentic, stable identity when it is produced
as a jointly authored technological achievement of genetic disguise be-
tween two male collaborators.10
Theorizing the masquerade
The display of artifice in the cinema has been widely debated within
feminist film theory through the concept of masquerade.11 Within the
psychoanalytic version of these debates, feminists have claimed that the
masquerade is not only closely connected to femininity but is also in-
extricable from its cultural ascription within patriarchal representational
systems such as Hollywood cinema. According to such a model, mas-
culinity can only be designated a place outside the performance of the
masquerade.12 Feminist film theorists, most notably Mary Ann Doane
([1982] 1991a, [1988–89] 1991b), have reread psychoanalyst Joan Ri-
10 There is now a vast literature that builds on the earlier work of Richard Dyer (1982)
and Steve Neale (1983) on the construction of masculinity as spectacle. For more recent
analyses, see Cohan and Hark 1993; Kirkham and Thumim 1993; Tasker 1993; Lehman
2001; Holmlund 2002.
11 Claire Johnston (1975) first used the term masquerade to analyze the place of woman
in film; for a detailed genealogy of the uses of the psychoanalytic term masquerade in film
theory during the 1970s and 1980s, see Fletcher 1988.
12 In her famous 1929 essay, “Womanliness as Masquerade,” Joan Riviere discusses the
case of a female academic who exaggerated her femininity following successfulpublic-speaking
engagements as a way to contradict her “theft” of masculine authority ([1929] 1986).
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viere’s original 1929 case to argue that theorizing “femininity as mas-
querade” might provide a means to explain the constraints of the place
of “woman as image” within a sign system governed by the law of the
paternal signifier. Riviere explored the idea that “women who wish for
masculinity may put on a mask of womanliness to avert anxiety and the
retribution feared from men” (Riviere [1929] 1986, 35). Importantly,
Doane argues, there is a “curious blend of activity and passivity in mas-
querade (Riviere’s patient actively strives to produce herself as the passive
image of male attention)” and there is a “corresponding blurring of the
opposition between production and reception” ([1988–89] 1991b, 39).
For Doane, the concept of the masquerade highlights a crucial contra-
diction “insofar as it attributes to the woman the distance, alienation and
divisiveness of self (which is constitutive of subjectivity in psychoanalysis)
rather than the closeness and excessive presence which are the logical
outcome of the psychoanalytic drama of sexualized linguistic difference”
([1988–89] 1991b, 37). Doane emphasizes here how central reading and
interpretation are to understanding both masquerade and femininity.
Thus, although the masquerade “is also haunted by a masculine standard,
masculinity as measure is not internal to the concept itself. . . . Rather,
in masquerade, masculinity is present as the context provoking the pa-
tient’s reaction-formation” (Doane [1988–89] 1991b, 39). Masculinity’s
relationship to masquerade is thus placed outside the concept itself and
takes form only in producing the reaction in the audience or the
readership.13
If duplicity through artifice has had such a strongly feminine set of
connotations within feminist film theory, how might we interpret the
masculine imitation of masculinity in a film such as Gattaca, in which two
male characters combine their ingenuity and their resources to produce
a deceptive image of genetic perfection?14 In the opening scene discussed
above, a spectacle of fetishistic bodily cleanliness and grooming, such
attention to the detail of a man’s bodily transformation establishes an
immediate association with femininity: that is, an identity achieved
through the labor of producing a perfect body using whatever artifice is
available and bearing whatever pain is necessary. In this scene, a number
of close-up shots of Vincent’s body confirm these more general feminine
connotations: the smooth, hairless skin, the somewhat androgynous chest,
the positioning and attachment of the urine bag as if it were a garter belt,
13 For a detailed discussion of masculinity and masquerade, see also Studlar 1996.
14 For discussions of the display of the masculine body through imitation and disguise,
see Cohan 1992, 397, and Holmlund 1993.
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the delicate and expert use of the eyebrow brush. Moreover, there is a
deeper association here based on the troubling potential for disguise in
an identity premised on artifice. For if the work of femininity is not only
to produce an image but thereby to achieve an identity, the figure of the
woman can be cast as the site for endless suspicion. Taking its most treach-
erous form in the figure of the femme fatale, the deployment of a physical
image to effect a disguise is a move associated with the deceit of femininity.
In this scene, the scrupulous shedding of hair and skin to produce a
smooth, less legible surface and the meticulous attachment of blood and
urine from refrigerated infusion bags all imply that the end product of
this ritual is some kind of deception.
Vincent’s impersonation of Jerome is potentially feminizing not only
as a prosthetic spectacle but also in its clear intention as criminal disguise.
As Doane points out, Riviere repeatedly associates the masquerade with
theft and “stolen goods,” since womanliness as masquerade covers the
theft of masculinity (Riviere [1929] 1986, 38). In Gattaca, Vincent is
not only associated with fraud, but, more significantly, his deception is
narratively tied in to a murder. The connection between Vincent and
criminality is elaborated in a number of ways: the sight of the murder of
one of Gattaca’s directors coincides with the dissolve into an extended
flashback in which Vincent’s voice-over explains the history of his fraud-
ulent identity to the audience; as the murder investigation accelerates,
detectives (headed, unbeknownst to the audience, by Vincent’s valid
brother, Anton) and their genetic screening devices threaten the continued
success of his disguise; moreover, his colleague and, later, lover, Irene
(Uma Thurman), becomes suspicious that Vincent did in fact murder the
director. The exploration of Vincent’s deception thus becomes narratively
inextricable from the investigation of the murder. Vincent is structurally
placed in the traditional position of the femme fatale—through its disguise,
his body is potentially associated with treachery.
In imitating Jerome, Vincent has “stolen” a masculinity that is not his
own. Does Vincent thereby somehow inhabit the traditionally feminine
place of the one who performs the image for the other? How is this
spectacle gendered if it displays an imitation of a better masculinity? In
her original essay, Doane wrote, “The masquerade, in flaunting femininity,
holds it at a distance. Womanliness is a mask that can be worn or removed.
The masquerade’s resistance to patriarchal positioning would therefore lie
in its denial of the production of femininity as closeness, as presence-to-
itself, as, precisely, imagistic. . . . To masquerade is to manufacture a lack
in the form of a certain distance between oneself and one’s image” (Doane
[1982] 1991a, 25–26). If, as Judith Butler has argued, “Riviere’s text
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offers a way to reconsider the question: What is masked by masquerade?”
(Butler 1990, 53), it is tempting to read the production of Vincent’s
imitative masculinity in Gattaca as the reverse of Doane’s description:
producing a closeness to the image that masculinity usually lacks, closing
the gap between the self and the image usually reserved for femininity,
or as the feminizing mask that sutures image and identity through genetic
disguise.15 But here the limits of the concept of masquerade become ap-
parent: with their exclusively visual emphasis, theories of masquerade can-
not capture the dynamics of genetic disguise at stake in Gattaca. Passing
through masquerade, Vincent perfects not only the image but also the
legibility of the code. Confirming the importance of Doane’s emphasis
on interpretation in the case of femininity as masquerade and yet moving
beyond the image as the exclusive site of the production of identity, genetic
disguise here confounds the formulations of such theories. Vincent’s im-
itation of genetic perfection is not so much a feminizing masquerade as
an imposture of informatics that turns inside out the meaning of identity.
If identity is now to be legible as a genetic code, new technologies of
interpretation open up possibilities of interference and intervention. Bio-
genetic mimesis becomes the new disavowal of authenticity.
This twist to the status of the image in Gattaca problematizes any
straightforward reading of Vincent’s disguise as simply a feminizing mas-
querade. Throughout the film, the promise of the truth of visual evidence
is subtly undermined even as it is reiterated: close-up shots of fragments
of the human body refer back to the credit sequence, where the micro-
scopic modes of spectatorship produce a striking proximity to the image
but do so ambiguously. In a world in which everyone’s genetic code can
be technologically translated into a visual image (the genetic identification
card shows the person’s name, DNA sequence, and photograph), the
authorities are so sure of the infallibility of their techniques of surveillance
that no one actually looks at photographs any more. As the broker who
introduces Vincent and Jerome says, “When was the last time anybody
looked at a photograph?” While surveillance technologies are intended
for social regulation, their ubiquity introduces new possibilities for dis-
guise; as Hillel Schwartz writes: “In a world of proliferant degrees and
diplomas, impostors have more room than ever to move on from one
half-life to the next. These days embossed papers substitute for person-
hood, identification cards for identity, licences for learning” (1996, 71).
The proliferation of information renders looking redundant. Turning their
domestic apartment into a stylish cloning laboratory, Vincent and Jerome
15 For a discussion of “female masculinity” in film, see Halberstam 1998.
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Figure 2 Vincent (Ethan Hawke) transforms himself into the new Jerome, the embodiment
of genetic perfection. Courtesy of the British Film Institute. Color version available as an
online enhancement.
succeed in an elaborate deception that plays the blind spots of the scientific
gaze back to the corporate authorities at Gattaca, dodging the scrutiny
of the scientific gaze by hiding in the shadows of its own occlusions.
Masculinity as singularity
The instability of visual evidence in Gattaca can be read as an analogue
to the film’s exploration of masculine desire. On the one hand, it is Vin-
cent’s highly conventional masculine drive and ambition that propel the
narrative forward and his success that brings satisfactory narrative closure.
As the surveillance tightens, the new Jerome becomes tougher and more
determined: as Jerome, he becomes invincible (not-Vincent; see fig. 2).
His potentially feminizing self-fabrication operates in the service of his
masculine desire for sovereignty and agency. And yet, on the other hand,
there is also a challenge to the stability of the all-seeing, all-knowing
masculine spectator position. For each time we might feel seduced by the
fantasy of panoptic vision through our shared point of view with the
protagonist, our omnipotent delusions are thwarted, not only as Vincent
himself faces the next unexpected challenge but also as we are dislodged
from the security of such an alignment. For example, the surprising dis-
covery that the detective in charge of the murder investigation is Vincent’s
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younger brother, Anton, reveals that our hero has been hiding something
even from us. Moreover, although the film deploys typical Hollywood
techniques (such as flashback and voice-over) in order to position the
spectator with Vincent, this is undermined by the lack of a sense of emo-
tional depth to Vincent’s interiority. Like the forms of its presentation,
Vincent’s subjectivity remains a convention.
Similarly, although the narrative is structured around Vincent’s desire
to achieve heroic status and to prove the justice of meritocracy, the film’s
own awareness of this as a convention of masculinity confounds its
straightforward alignment with spectatorial pleasure. Vincent’s desire for
autonomous agency is presented precisely as his desire; it never fully be-
comes his identity. For as we shall see, Vincent never fully inhabits “valid”
masculinity; he never fully becomes the author of his new identity as
Jerome. The film’s repeated thwarting of Vincent’s desire to author his
own success is a narrative device to produce suspense, and yet it has the
cumulative effect of questioning the foundational drive behind it. Gattaca
explores Vincent’s masculine drive and, in placing him outside the dom-
inant eugenic values of his society, invites us to invest in the success of
his deception, and yet in denying him agency in his final achievement,
ultimately leaves Vincent’s desire for autonomy as a fantasy position. This
works in conjunction with the way the film places him (along with Gattaca
and its eugenic project) at one remove from the critical spectator position
it establishes. For Vincent wants to be accepted by the very institution
whose values his story has taught us to mistrust and abhor, and thus our
position in relation to his success remains partially skeptical. Like the
breathtaking scale of the monumentalist architecture or the impressive
symmetry of the chrome interiors, Vincent’s ambition belongs to a mas-
culine order that the film renders politically dubious, based as it is on an
illusory fantasy of control, predictability, and order. The film presents this
fantasy of masculinity through a series of reiterative performances, and in
so doing it both animates masculine desire for omnipotence and disavows
the credibility of these performances by locating them firmly within a
eugenic aesthetic associated with dangerous delusions of totalitarianism
and fascism.
The modes of disjunctive temporality that operate in the film further
mark the gap between Vincent’s desire and that of the spectator. For
Gattaca is an all-too-familiar version of the future. Using cliche´d fantasies
of technoscientific endeavor from the “not-too-distant past” (such as
rocket science and space travel), Gattaca presents the masculine desire
governing the hierarchies of a genetically determinist world as an ironic
reflection on the modernist vision of the earlier period in which they are
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placed: the flashback to Vincent’s childhood offers sepia scenes of ste-
reotypical 1950s family life, together with retro-style furniture, cars, and
clothes; the use of space exploration as the mise-en-sce`ne of masculine
ambition plays with a now-outmoded notion of space travel as the “final
frontier” for the progress of mankind. The image of a rocket launching
into space (with which the film closes) to symbolize the final realization
of Vincent’s dream places the spectator in the paradoxical temporality of
being transported back to the future.
Vincent’s masculinity in Gattaca is thus the rehearsal of a desire rather
than the achievement of an identity. As Joan Copjec has pointed out,
according to Jacques Lacan “no man can boast that he embodies this
thing—masculinity. All pretensions of masculinity are then sheer impos-
ture; just as every display of femininity is sheer masquerade” (Copjec 1994,
234). Vincent’s genetic disguise makes him the impostor who exposes the
more general facade of “authentic” masculinity. It is as much about the
repetition of the impossibility of masculinity (as the invincible, autono-
mous agent of events, as the original and the originator of meaning) as
it is about the securing of its authentic form: “Impostures succeed because,
not in spite, of their fictitiousness. They take wing with congenial cultural
fantasies” (Schwartz 1996, 71). Vincent performs the pretense of mas-
culinity, and his elaborate disguise is a cinematic enactment of the im-
possibility of ever embodying its literal form. In short, Vincent is an
impostor whose disguise reveals him to be surrounded by impostors. For
Copjec, Lacan’s “desubstantialization of sex . . . has allowed us to per-
ceive the fraudulence at the heart of every claim to positive sexual identity”
(Copjec 1994, 234). Butler elaborates Lacan’s position thus: “[Lacan]
poses the relation between the sexes in terms that reveal the speaking ‘I’
as a masculinized effect of repression, one which postures as an autono-
mous and self-grounding subject, but whose very coherence is called into
question by the sexual relation that it excludes in the process of identity
formation. . . . The masculine subject only appears to originate meaning
and thereby to signify. His seemingly self-grounded autonomy attempts
to conceal the repression which is both its ground and the perpetual
possibility of its own ungrounding” (Butler 1990, 44–45). In Gattaca,
the masculine subject appears to originate not only meaning but also life
itself.16 The repression required for the fraudulence of identity to succeed
is turned into a science. The maternal body, as Susan George has argued,
is displaced by the genetic selection of embryos before they are implanted
16 For a discussion of “life itself” in the context of the new genetics, see Franklin 2000,
188–227.
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into the woman’s body, rendering the mother marginal to reproduction
(George 2001). Contrasting with the very physical scene of Vincent’s
birth earlier in the film, which shows the sweat and pain of his mother
in labor, Anton’s genetic selection shows four embryos imaged on a com-
puter screen. Vincent’s parents must agree to the suggested selection of
the chosen one, the singular promise of embodied perfection. The ge-
neticist (like the manager at the company who will later reject Vincent as
an in-valid before the job interview begins) is black, suggesting the sep-
aration of eugenics from its racist past and cautioning against the new
hierarchies beyond race that genetic normativity might produce. The dis-
play of the four embryos on the screen alongside the recitation of the
genetic information transforms reproduction from a scene of human risk
and adventure into one of an exact predictable science and conception
into a disembodied virtual selection of a known entity. Reproduction
hereby becomes a form of authorship, as the masculine subject becomes
the originator of meaning and paternity takes on the art of science.17
The promise of genetic screening is to give a scientific certainty to the
fantasy of authorship and autonomy that governs conventional masculinity.
The film systematically presents but then undoes the foundations of such
a fantasy through its exposure of the illusions of the predictive certainty
of genetic codes. One by one, each of the genetic predictions whose truths
have justified the structures of Gattaca’s unjust society is undermined:
the genetically guaranteed peaceful director of Gattaca turns to murder
to defend his galactic vision; the doctor at Gattaca has an in-valid son,
despite all the technological means at his disposal; genetically perfect Je-
rome wins only the silver medal and consequently attempts suicide (leaving
him in a wheelchair); and valid Anton cannot match in-valid Vincent’s
intellectual ingenuity or physical determination. These masculine subjects
become the “impostors” against whom Vincent pits his willpower and his
intelligence: Can he trick the director, can he become Jerome, can he beat
Anton? In his fraudulent genetic identity, as the one who “postures as an
autonomous and self-grounding subject” and yet can never be one, Vin-
cent repeatedly performs his masculinity in relation to a series of masculine
others who represent the threat of the “perpetual possibility of [his] own
ungrounding” (Butler 1990, 45). The substance of his masculinity is
tested through a series of challenges to the “masculine impostors” around
Vincent who stand for the supposed genetic perfection of the valid sign.
17 Rosi Braidotti offers a critique of how fantasies of reproductive technologies in science
fiction film have produced the reinvention of a paternity that allows the exclusion of women
from reproduction; see Braidotti 2002, 222–63.
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Genetic perfection is the scientific equivalent of masculine singularity.
As Marie-Luise Angerer (2000) has argued, from a Lacanian position the
fraudulence of masculinity lies in its imagined singularity. The imposture
of masculinity is the imagining of the self as singular, as “the one”—the
only one. In Gattaca, Vincent rehearses this fantasy. Can he become the
author of his own desired identity? Can he prove he is “the one”? But
Vincent’s ambition to demonstrate the outstanding singularity of his mas-
culinity, by pitting it against the superior claims of the valids, produces
instead a relational identity, proving perfection in singularity to be an
illusion.
Impostors and impersonators
Nowhere is the singularity of Vincent’s heroic masculinity more clearly
undone than in his collaboration with Jerome: it is not one but two men
who defy the laws of genetic determinism in Gattaca. Vincent’s individual
agency is dependent on a collaborative, relational masculinity, for this is
not a single imposture but a duplicity—as this word suggests, this is a
double vision. This twofold agency requires an investigation of Vincent
not only as an impostor but also as an impersonator. In thinking about
this distinction in relation to doubles (“imposture, the compulsive as-
sumption of invented lives, and impersonation, the concerted assumption
of another’s public identity” [Schwartz 1996, 72]), Schwartz writes:
“Double agency, implying a singleminded performance of two opposed
roles with silent devotion to a cause, is the impersonator’s stock in trade.
. . . But impostors are unable to bear the burdens of double agency.
Impersonation, not imposture, is at home with quiet deceit and may breed
underground. Both may be impeccably costumed, yet in the final dressing
down, impostors want attention and love, and we may betray them; im-
personators want our money, our secrets, our family, and they betray us”
(1996, 72–73). If the masculine impostor is the one who appears to have
achieved the singularity of autonomy and self-grounding, then the mas-
culine impersonator is the one who recognizes the paradox of the need
for an other in order to achieve this illusion. In queer debates, Butler has
famously drawn on Esther Newton’s work on drag queens in the United
States to argue that “the structure of impersonation reveals one of the
key fabricating mechanisms through which the social construction of gen-
der takes place” (Butler 1990, 136–37).18 Claiming that “drag fully sub-
18 In his work on Hollywood stars, Martin Shingler has pointed toward a theoretical
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verts the distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively
mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true
gender identity” (1990, 137), Butler quotes Newton’s account of drag
as follows: “At its most complex [drag] is a double inversion that says
‘appearance is an illusion.’ Drag says . . . ‘my “outside” appearance is
feminine, but my essence “inside” [the body] is masculine.’ At the same
time it symbolizes the opposite inversion: ‘my appearance “outside” [my
body, my gender] is masculine but my essence “inside” [myself] is fem-
inine’” (Newton 1972, 103). For Butler, drag visibly stages the gaps
between the anatomy of the performer, gender identity, and the gender
being performed: “In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative
structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency” (Butler 1990, 137;
emphasis in original). Here repetition is crucial to thinking about the
structure of impersonation. In her discussion of the problems of “writing
as a lesbian,” Butler suggests that “it is through the repeated play of this
sexuality that the ‘I’ is insistently reconstituted as a lesbian ‘I’; paradox-
ically, it is precisely the repetition of that play that establishes as well the
instability of the very category that it constitutes” (1991, 18; emphasis
in original). To the extent that impersonation requires the repetition of
duplicity, we might ask, Does it make visible the internal contradictions
of identity that will lead to its ultimate failure?19 Extending feminist film
theory through queer notions of impersonation, we might ask, What is
specifically at stake when the “he” is the site of repetition, of the ritualized
reconstruction of masculine perfection on the screen? In his impersonation
of Jerome, is Vincent caught in the same linguistic bind that will eventually
ensure his exposure, his failure?
To impersonate is “to invest with personality or the bodily substance
of a person.”20 The addition of the supposedly unique attributes of “per-
sonality” or of “bodily substance” to another suggests an artificiality that
is the reverse of impersonation’s authenticating intention (the desire to
pass as someone else). Impersonation thus makes a double move: it in-
volves the production of authenticity and of a copy. It both effects and
undoes personhood. But how might we think about the cinematic fantasy
of a double impersonation, in which two bodies combine to produce a
model that might combine psychoanalytic theories of masquerade with Butler’s rereading of
gender impersonation through drag (Shingler 1995, 192).
19 For Steve Cohan, Butler’s insistence on gender as “performative—that is, constituting
the identity it is purported to be” (Butler 1990, 25)—allows for the consideration of mas-
culinity as masquerade in film, not as a mask but as a “persona” (Cohan 1992, 398).
20 Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers, 1973).
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renewed version of genetic perfection? In impersonating Jerome, Vincent
invests himself with the bodily substance (the DNA sequence) and, by
implication, the personality of another. It is their combined labor that
achieves a composite impersonation of masculine perfection: Jerome pro-
duces his own bodily fragments and samples, and Vincent reembodies
them to produce the new Jerome.
If the masquerade functions as an imitation of a feminine identity that
is already a mask, what kind of masculinity is achieved through the im-
personation of genetic perfection? The concept of impersonation captures
the new tension between image and identity invoked by genetic engi-
neering, which produces both original and copy. The binarisms (original
and copy, authenticity and artifice, self and other) of traditional identity
formation become redundant as biological reproduction is replaced by
genetic selection and recognition is now based on DNA profiling. If im-
personation means to invest with the personality or the bodily substance
of a person, is genetic perfection not thereby already an impersonation?
The new genetics invites us to intervene in the identities and futures of
others. In his impersonation of Jerome’s supposedly unique genetic iden-
tity, Vincent confounds the truth claims of the predictions of technosci-
ence and of the singularity of masculinity. His deception literalizes the
question of the legibility of identity—of the language of genetics and the
language of gender. The supposed transparency of genetic information is
opened up to the politics of interpretation; the supposed authenticity of
masculinity is exposed as a set of techniques that has become a marketable
commodity. In the dynamic between Vincent and Jerome, masculinity
shifts back and forth between them and becomes a transferable skill.
With the making of the new Jerome, there is a transfer of power and
authority between the in-valid Vincent and the previously valid but now
immobilized Jerome. The scenes of Vincent’s early adult life show the
impossibility of his becoming the self-grounding subject of masculinity:
he is part of the anonymous workforce that polishes the shiny surfaces at
Gattaca in which “the chosen ones” will see themselves reflected back as
the proper subjects they desire to be. But he cannot bear the repetitive
work of cleaning (work typically associated with women, black people,
and the working classes but here designated across those divisions to a
new menial labor force of genetic imperfection) and attempts to build up
his own body in order to turn himself into a proper figure of masculine
strength. Eventually, he recognizes he cannot go it alone; he needs a
borrowed ladder to climb up the genetic hierarchy to achieve masculine
agency.
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Figure 3 Jerome (Jude Law) as the embodiment of failed masculine genetic perfection: the
in-validated “valid.” Courtesy of the British Film Institute. Color version available as an
online enhancement.
Jerome, on the other hand, enters the film as a valid who is marked
through his disability as an in-valid. He first appears sitting in his wheel-
chair, smoking and scrutinizing Vincent with his piercing blue eyes (see
fig. 3). His wheelchair sits at the foot of the double helix–shaped staircase,
the striking spiral design of which cruelly literalizes his exclusion from the
sign of his previous superiority and emphasizes the irony of genetic per-
fection in the face of immobility. Although his disability excludes him
from valid masculinity, he struggles to retain the superior status suggested
by his air of upper-class English affectation. But such condescension is
undercut by signs of decline and decadence, indicative of a similar loss of
social power and status. His disability marks the imposture of his previously
valid status (winning “only” a silver medal and then attempting, and
failing, to commit suicide); despite his DNA, he cannot be “the one.”
Nothing guarantees the successful embodiment of perfection; its fragility
is the only certainty. Jerome thus represents the desired masculinity of
genetic selection while simultaneously marking the fragility of its embod-
ied capacity.
But Jerome’s masculinity is reauthorized in a later scene, appropriately
enough through his impersonation of himself. Jerome leaves his wheel-
chair and hauls himself up the double helix staircase to greet the detective,
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Anton (distracting him from the technologies of impersonation on the
floor below).21 As he accomplishes this almost impossible feat of passing
as his previously able-bodied self, dignity, self-respect, and masculine in-
tegrity are restored to Jerome. Ironically, it is through impersonation that
masculinity is repeatedly deauthorized and reauthorized throughout the
film; its varying degrees are articulated in the two men’s identities in highly
relational terms.22
Queering kinship
This complex relay of transferable identities brings with it a series of
associations of kin relatedness. Although this is a nonbiological relation-
ship in the traditional genealogical sense, it is nevertheless all about shared
biogenetic substances. Repeated close-up shots of bodily substances invoke
a sense of shared embodiment through a nongenealogical kinship bond.
If the blood tie has been Western culture’s mark of genealogy through
kinship, then Vincent and Jerome reinvent kinship through the use of the
borrowed ladder. In this distinctly unconventional exchange of genetic
material through prosthetic embodiment, the permanent and enduring
ties of genealogy are replaced by a new relatedness.
Contrasting traditional notions of kinship ties as “unalterable biogen-
etic connections [that] accounted for the permanence of this very special
sort of social relation” (1998, 58) with new forms of relatedness, or “fictive
kinship” (1991, 105), Kath Weston explores the enduring loyalty and
commitment of queer kinship systems. In Gattaca, Vincent’s adoption of
a new biogenetic identity occurs not only in the context of his rejection
of his biological family but also, in the end, through a filial power struggle
that he wins: in all the loyalty tests, “fictive kinship” wins out over ge-
nealogy. But perhaps improvised kinship is a better term for Vincent and
Jerome’s relationship. As in all improvisations, this new form of kinship
relies both on experimentation and risk and on a mutual trust and a shared
knowledge. While it is at first a pragmatic business deal in which the
borrowed ladder is a commodity, the intimacy between the two characters
soon stretches beyond purely commercial necessity. Vincent and Jerome’s
21 This scene echoes Scottie’s famous attempt to overcome his anxiety and climb the
steps of the church tower in Vertigo (1958). See Modleski 1988.
22 The investment of Jerome with a masculinity so desirable that others want to become
him represents a recurrent dimension of Jude Law’s star image; see, e.g., The Talented Mr.
Ripley (1999) and Straayer 2001. In both eXistenZ (1999) and Artificial Intelligence (2001),
Law is positioned as the object of desire; he embodies the ideals of masculine perfection,
but his relationship to artificiality places him at one remove from such an embodiment.
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improvisation produces a commitment typically reserved only for kin or
for lovers: they share bodily substances; they willingly risk their lives for
each other.
The improvised kinship tie between Vincent and Jerome is given sym-
bolic permanence in the scene of Jerome’s suicide. As Vincent is reborn
in the closing scene, Jerome is released from life. As Weston argues, “Only
a biological process (death), as opposed to a social process (rejection,
neglect), is supposed to be capable of sundering ‘blood’ ties. In this read-
ing death becomes the terminus that marks the forever in a relationship”
(1998, 78). With Jerome’s death comes the confirmation of their per-
manent tie; in this romantic image of foreverness, the fantasy of a shared
future is confirmed. When the two finally separate (Jerome commits su-
icide, Vincent goes into space), Jerome gives Vincent a lock of his hair—
an ironically romantic gesture in the wake of their genetic impersonation.
So how might the forms of genetic impersonation and queer impro-
visations of kinship in Gattaca require us to extend our thinking about
sexuality in the culture of the copy? As is so often the case in popular
representations of genetic engineering, the heterosexual/homosexual dis-
tinction is clearly under scrutiny here. Throughout the film, the anxiety
about detection is staged around what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has called
“the relations of the closet—the relations of the known and the unknown,
the explicit and the implicit” (Sedgwick 1994, 3). Vincent and Jerome’s
deception places them in a shared domestic space full of secrets, puts them
at odds with society, and requires their utter loyalty to each other in the
project of passing; their mutual trust is paramount to the success of their
crime.23 The relations of the closet that govern the staging of their con-
spiracy are reiterated in the homosexual connotations of the “perfect
match” of Vincent and Jerome: the broker comments that “you two look
so good together, I want to double my fee.” The labor involved in the
crime of genetic deception produces a physical intimacy between them
that reinforces these associations. Vincent literally wears Jerome’s body
on his own. Jerome’s gift to Vincent before his eventual (successful) su-
icide is to leave him samples of his bodily fluids—“enough for two life-
times.” Through what we might call the “prosthetic intimacy” of genetic
23 Along with lesbian and gay “passing,” there are other forms of passing that are ob-
viously connoted here: the rejection of Vincent from education and employment in Gattaca
is reminiscent of the exclusion of black people from nurseries, schools, and jobs in the United
States prior to the civil rights era. For a discussion of racial passing, see Young 1996 and
Ahmed 1999.
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impersonation, Vincent and Jerome share the most intricate knowledge
of each other’s bodies.
Even more explicitly homosexual associations are articulated through
Jerome’s persona as the upper-class British fading retrodandy and self-
pitying lush. He combines many of the qualities of what Richard Dyer
identifies as the “sad young man” of 1950s and 1960s cinema: he is a
figure of pity who is often shown as melancholic, pathetic, and both “ir-
redeemably sad and overwhelmingly desirable” (Dyer 1993, 73). Squab-
bling on the telephone with the hair dye supplier about whether they have
sent him “summer wheat” instead of “honey dawn,” he enacts the classic
stereotype of the “neurotic, hysterical, bitchy gay man” (Dyer 1993, 84).
Their relationship also performs many of the cliche´s of a conventional
heterosexual marriage: Vincent is the husband who goes out to work and
is ambitious in the public sphere; Jerome stays at home and fusses over
domestic routines and cosmetics. He drinks more and more and begins
to act like a frustrated and jealous housewife. Ultimately, the only meaning
in Jerome’s life is sharing Vincent’s dream.
This homoerotic intimacy, however, is disrupted by a third (female)
term—that of Irene. This configuration is typical of what Sedgwick iden-
tifies as “a cultural system in which male-male desire [has become] widely
intelligible primarily by being routed through triangular relations involv-
ing a woman” (Sedgwick 1994, 15). As the object of romantic interest
for Vincent, Irene poses a threat to the exclusivity of the male bond
between Vincent and Jerome.24 And yet Irene also has an uncanny re-
semblance to Jerome: she shares his facial characteristics—high cheek-
bones, wide jawline, steel-blue eyes, neat nose—and so mirrors Jerome’s
embodiment of white perfection. As such, Irene is placed as the feminine
counterpart or even the heterosexual equivalent of Jerome (see fig. 4).
Although Vincent’s relationship with Irene is in some senses a traditional
heterosexual romance, it might also be read through what Sedgwick calls
the “projective fantasy” of “vicariated desire” (1994, 156–57). The notion
of “chains of vicariation” (1994, 159) points to the interplay between
identification and desire and between sameness and difference articulated
in these triangular substitutions. Thus, we might ask, with Sedgwick,
“How are we to know whose desire it is that is . . . figured? By whom
can it be figured?” (1994, 157).
24 The triangulated dynamics of “homosocial desire,” normally opposed to homosexual
desire, is the subject of Sedgwick’s (1985) analysis of the “discriminations and paradoxes”
of such an ascription. For a discussion of these triangular dynamics in the novel The Talented
Mr. Ripley (Highsmith [1955] 1992), see Straayer 2001, 116.
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Figure 4 Irene (Uma Thurman) as the uncanny heterosexual female equivalent of Jerome
(Jude Law). Courtesy of the British Film Institute. Color version available as an online
enhancement.
This problem is amplified in a film about genetic impersonation: as an
impersonation, Vincent is already a substitute for Jerome, and as a valid,
Jerome is already “artificially” genetically selected. These genetic imper-
sonations figure multiple “chains of vicariation” that disrupt the singularity
of gender and sexuality and the authenticity of their embodied forms.
Vicarious desire for an impersonation presents an endless series of sub-
stitutions. Irene might be understood as a heterosexual object of desire,
but one whose role is inextricable from the intimacy between Vincent and
Jerome, an intimacy that is itself founded on a desire to become the other.
In this context we might ask, Is Irene a substitute love object for Jerome,
or is Vincent? When Jerome is feeling jealous, is he wishing he were
Vincent or Irene? Is Vincent sexually appealing to Irene only in his im-
personation of Jerome? Following the logic of this relay of queer substi-
tutions through to its conclusion, we might ask if Jerome desires himself
(in desiring to be Vincent, who desires Irene, who is a substitute for
Jerome). Indeed, perhaps this leads to the most disturbing fantasy about
cloning—that we shall end up desiring ourselves.25
Gattaca presents a vision of the triumph of individual masculine desire
25 Thanks to Amelia Jones for her insightful comments on our underlying fears about
cloning.
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that is repeatedly undercut by the doubly destabilizing and denaturalizing
effects of these queer kinship improvisations and genetic impersonations.
The substitutions that are facilitated by impersonation “queer” the sin-
gularity, intentionality, and directionality of desire. The scene in which
Jerome hauls himself up the staircase to impersonate himself perfectly
illustrates this: “I think she likes us,” he says to Vincent, including himself
as the plural object of desire for Irene. The composite fantasy of the new
Jerome is the product of a homoerotic collaboration that is an imperson-
ation of an impersonation: a vision of hypermasculine perfection as a
cultural achievement in which genetic selection has already undermined
the naturalness of identity and produced an artificially enhanced version
of that masculinity.
In the face of the undoing of masculine singularity by these prosthetic
relationalities and vicarious substitutions, the liberal humanism that has
haunted the whole film surfaces more fully in the penultimate scene as a
vehicle for masculine heroism in the absence of its more foundational
securities. The film presents us (perhaps somewhat ironically) with Gat-
taca’s vision of humanity as the sign of resolution, harmony, and hope.
As Jerome prepares to commit suicide, Vincent’s impersonation of him
is revealed to have been no secret to Gattaca’s doctor, who has tested his
blood and urine since his first genetic “interview” at the space station.
All the costly and devoted labor of scientifically precise disguise is rendered
potentially redundant by one unconscious masculine gesture: “For future
reference, right-handed men don’t hold it with their left, it’s just one of
those things,” he tells Vincent. Replacing the image of Vincent’s in-valid
identification card with Jerome’s valid one, he confesses to Vincent about
his in-valid son, who would also like to work at Gattaca. The ultimate
threat to expose Vincent’s elaborate impersonation comes from a father
with the power to prohibit, who decides not to because he wants a sign
of hope for his own in-valid son. He is the good father who, unlike
Vincent’s own, recognizes human potential in vulnerability and wishes to
protect the imperfection that is human nature. Against the eugenic values
of Gattaca, the figure of the doctor at the space station is the skeptical
scientist as a model of the humane gatekeeper; his humanity comes from
a compassion borne of proximity to genetic in-validity. As the film’s tagline
puts it: “There is no gene for the human spirit.” Or, we might conclude,
if there is, it is an in-valid one.
In contrast to the doctor’s humanity, the space station’s vision of a
“panhuman” future presented in the final scene in the rocket appears as
artificial as its genetic engineering: the scene displays a markedly multi-
cultural crew as reassurance against the potentially racist eugenics of ge-
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netic determinism. As the camera pans around the inside of the spaceship,
showing close-up shots of the different faces of the human race, a vision
of multicultural diversity represents the new eugenic humanism of the
future. Just as the image of a rocket launching into space as a symbol of
Vincent’s masculine achievement is a playful reiteration of a modern cliche´
of the gendering of technology, so the image of genetic technology pro-
ducing a diverse global humanism leaves the audience with a familiar, and
rather unconvincing, fantasy of unity through racial diversity. This highly
modern version of “panhumanity” is produced by technology (the vision
of the blue planet from space in the 1960s) and yet also promises to offer
a resistance to technology (the potential evil of genetic determinism).26
To be included in this fantasy of panhumanity, Vincent has first to be
exposed, for “imposture is not imposture until its duplicity is laid bare,
and when impostors persist, treading in their own footsteps, they are not
deranged but faithful to a lifelong project that oscillates towards the spir-
itual” (Schwartz 1996, 71). If masculinity is sheer imposture, and Vincent
realizes his ambition in the very moment his duplicity is laid bare, then
the void left behind by such a disrobing might be filled by the promise
of the power of the human spirit.
Cinematic fantasies of the new genetics push feminist film theory to-
ward queer reflections on the limits of its own means of reproducing itself.
If femininity as masquerade opened up the possibility of showing the
contradictions of the place of woman as image in a patriarchal sign system,
revealing in the end that there was, in fact, nothing behind the mask but
another mask, masculinity as impersonation points to the dangerous il-
lusory aspirations of singularity and perfection that govern the drive for
agency, self-grounding, and authorship on the other side of the axis. But
the display of the labor of artifice in the name of the genetic impersonation
of masculine perfection troubles any easy attribution of gender, producing
instead an ambiguity that plays across the binary of sexual difference,
queering the previous categories of feminist film theory. For the hetero/
homo distinction takes on a new significance in the culture of the copy,
complicating the question of how we know “whose desire is being figured”
(Sedgwick 1994, 157). The reproduction of sameness through sexual
difference is no longer so straightforward when the means for assuring
its continuity are new technologies of replication that trouble the authority
of paternity, inheritance, and heterosexuality in the cultural imagination.
Vicarious sexual substitutions proliferate in the new cultures designed to
26 For an analysis of the concept of “panhumanity” in global culture, see Franklin, Lury,
and Stacey 2000, 37–42.
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imitate nature. It seems we should trust neither the cinematic nor the
scientific evidence before us that promises perfection or predictability. If
the artifice of the image (femininity as the presentation of the desire of
the other) moves into the territory of the new genetic imaginary, in which
technologies of cell replication provide the basis for fantasies for copying
the self, then the battle over representation becomes, inevitably, a battle
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